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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are occasions in scholarly life where a controversy is initiated that endures for 
generations. “The Two Cultures” by C. P. Snow published in 1959, extended 
subsequently by the author to include yet a third, mediating culture of “social 
historians,”1  constitutes such a foray. William Rehg has visited this exchange to examine 
Snow’s contextual presuppositions found in distinguishing scientific from literary 
cultures. He observes that the making of public argument is “conditioned by the culture 
context” in which positions are advanced, understood, criticized and defended. This 
insight extends Snow to the study of argument cultures. Importantly, Professor Rehg 
draws attention to the relationships between these scientific and literary constellations as 
well as there differences. Indeed, in Rehg’s view, Snow’s most important contribution is 
to recognize the need “for greater communication between the two cultures,” as well as to 
investigate the “affective and evaluative aspects of argument cultures that undermine 
such communication.” Thus, “Two Cultures” invites communicative repair work into 
uncertain relationships between science and technological practice on the one side, and 
literary production and critical ambitions on the other. Hope is restored when a path is 
fashioned from disrespect between the cultures to a productive state of “heterogonous 
solidarity.” 
 
2. EXPLICATING CULTURES OF ARGUMENT 
 
In Rehg’s reading, Snow’s cultures are a two-sided coin offering a space for “intellectual 
development” and “a way of life” shared in “social practices.”2 A culture is a social body 
that may be understood anthropologically in its production of common ways of reasoning 
and exchange. At the same time an argument culture can be regarded normatively as 
putting at stake claims bound-by-context—that invite thinking both within and against its 
                                                            
1 Snow, C. P. (2008). The Two Cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2 Rehg, p. 1. 
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boundaries. Thus, Snow’s two cultures are differentiated by characteristic styles, 
“culture-specific emotional attitudes, assumptions about the human condition, and visions 
of the good society.” An argument culture is a coalesced, practice-embedded aesthetic, 
axiological, and ethical communicative space where what are offered as supported, or 
even interesting, reason-validated claims are called to account. These do indeed appear 
the categories from which Snow is working out of his experiences as an author and 
involvement with organizing scientific personnel during the Second World War. Whether 
they are necessary and sufficient categories to identify and distinguish between science 
and literature as cultures generally or argument cultures overall is an issue that remains to 
be addressed. Nevertheless, the recognition that an argument culture is a multi-
dimensional communicative space is important.  
 
3. WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 
 
The contextual study of communication appears to me to be compatible with the idea of 
bounded communicative rationality. Bounded rationality is a human condition which 
admits to our imperfect abilities to master all relevant information when coming to a 
judgment, decision, or verdict.3 Individually limited, humans sometimes turn to assemble 
communities of knowledge acquisition and use. Such cultures are constituted in bounded 
communication practices. Argument  
 
cultures depend upon social-institutional sites, whether these are formally institutionalized or 
merely informal gathering places, where members can come together and sustain their identi[ty] as 
members of the culture in question,  
 
Rehg observes.4 Intersubjective understandings are acquired and developed within the 
context of institutional identifications for and within which specialists train, network, 
develop, and practice.  
The boundaries of a culture are distinguished by domains of attractive problems 
and tasty solutions. Snow’s preference appears to be for the sweet parsimony of a 
scientific endeavour, well-directed by a controlled solution to a nettling problem. An 
aesthetic of moving from reserved anticipation, to the excitement of discovery, to the 
equanimity of testing results and tracking further inference is a quiet drama that 
reinforces progressive cultural projects. In contrast, the unsettling styles of literary 
authorship leave little but dissatisfactions in their wake. Romantic replies to the industrial 
revolution spread dissatisfaction that slows progress down, when it but needs to be 
speeded up. Modernist indwelling on literary form shakes the world loose further from its 
practical bearings. In either case, practices of literary culture slip from social-institutional 
bearings and fail to inform of anything other than the egotism of the artist, at least 
according to Snow. 
The combination of work and reward, in Rehg’s view, explains why Snow’s essay 
drives toward competing visions of the good society. Roughly, Snow appears to draw 
from science in the era of classical economics where solutions to social ills resided in 
scientifically discovered, technological enabled collective capacities to overcome nature’s 
                                                            
3 Simon, H. (1991). Bounded rationality and organizational learning. Organizational Science, 2, 125-134. 
4 Rehg, p. 6 
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stingy boundaries. The overall longevity of life and swelling populations enhanced by 
scientific discovery and technological application, underscores Snow’s point even if the 
master narrative of progress is no longer powerful. If the benefits of science are not 
shared, however, it may not be the fault of those who expand nature’s cornucopia Snow 
could reply. Still, science and technology must make investments in research and link 
findings to clinical practice and social development. If literature can but celebrate its own 
aesthetic practices and engage in critical flailing, then the humanities cannot offer to 
science and technology insight or guidance on its choices. 
The responsibility for absence of such a language, in Snow’s judgment, is clearly 
one way. Snow cannot resist condemning twentieth century writers as not only 
“politically silly, but politically wicked.” He cannot answer in the negative the question 
of whether “the influence of all they represent br[ought] Auschwitz that much nearer?”5 
He does not come close to mentioning Hiroshima or Nagasaki that ushered in a Cold War 
of progressively greater terror embedded in the science of cybernetics and the practice of 
game theory. Instead, Snow invokes the abstract formula of nuclear fission as having 
potential for evil or for good.6 At the same time, he is aware that with such growing 
power, the risks of bad scientific advice among possible choices could have disastrous 
consequences, and that “decision-makers” have no capacity or reliable cultural methods 
to test whether scientific advice “is good or bad.”7 Indeed, his own lack of balance in 
judging twentieth century science and literature appears to reflect the very “little fellow 
feeling” and outright “hostility” of which he warns.8 Indeed, his belated recognition of a 
place at all for a third culture, the social sciences speaks to the absence of a full 
discussion of the development of a mediating position between the two.  
Professor Rehg diagnoses three causes of ill-will between argument cultures and 
offers correctives that promise to open collaborative spaces among argument cultures. 
Drawing from Snow, these appear to be communicative spaces where an ethos is 
cultivated among members, educated into a practice, who interact in a social or 
institutional setting  by deploying elements of reasoning, exchange and debate according 
to standards of cogency developed within a vision of a good society—an argument 
culture.  
 
4. CORRECTING HUBRIS    
 
Science breeds confidence, but excessive optimism is not a good in itself—especially 
when accompanied by an outlook that demeans other, independent communities of 
reasoning.  
 
The affective aspect of a cultural ethos makes it understandable that members could tend to 
develop a particular conception of the common good for a whole society, in which their 
contribution would play the central or most necessary role,  
 
                                                            
5 Snow, C. P., p. 9. 
6 Snow, p. 67. 
7 Snow, p. 98. 
8 Snow, p. 61. 
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Rehg concludes.9 If this premise is true, then literature can and should provide a 
corrective that makes articulate the unanticipated consequences of what appears to be 
good within a technical boundary.  
 
Such depictions constitute contexts for evaluating scientists’ claims about the benefits of some 
proposed technology, or claims about the importance of a line of research. They bring abstract 
scientific arguments and statistics down to the earth of concrete human experience,  
 
he writes. 10  
I would add that the critical imaginary need not create only a language within 
which the past is remembered or the present rendered articulate. The literary imaginary 
can reach to conditions not yet realized, thereby creating a spur to scientists and engineers 
to research, invent, and produce new work. Katherine Hayles dwells on the link between 
literary constructions of worlds yet real and the directions of cybernetics and the 
communication revolutions of the 21st century.11  Indeed, with human bodies intersecting 
with information systems and technologies, it becomes increasingly difficult to sort out 
two cultures, even as critical literary efforts can imagine the tensions that abide and pull 
in the choices to become (post)human. 
 
5. ISSUES OF TRANSLATION 
 
The benefits of science cannot be presupposed to flow robustly from theory to discovery 
to technology and into clinical practice, even though such transferral may generate 
optimal effects for individual and collective uses. Rehg requests that cultures be brought 
into dialogue so that each understands the capacity and limits of the other. The need for 
such a project in medicine is recognized by the National Institute of Health in the United 
States. The gaps between growth in technical capabilities, clinical practices, and public 
knowledge should be repaired by attention to translation duties among different levels of 
judgment and expertise. Clinical practices are evolving as panels of experts assemble and 
translate arguments into evaluative spaces for judgment on the part of physicians and 
participation by patients. Milos Jenick and David Hitchcock have been at work 
developing evidence-based practices of medicine.12 While it is well that two-cultures 
retain some distance, the discovery of practices through translation of context-bounded 
knowledge resulting in collaborative communication and informed judgment appears to 
be promising.13 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 Rehg, p. 19. 
10 Rehg, p. 13. 
11Hayles, N. K. (1999). How We Became Posthuman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
  12 Jenick, M. (2003). Foundations of evidence-based medicine. Informa Health Care; Jenicek, M. and D. 
Hitchcock (2005). Evidence-based practice: logic and critical thinking  in medicine. AMA Press. 
13 Translation study has been limited to medicine. It would be useful to figure for each modern field and its 
argument culture strategies for creating communicative competence among various levels of practice within 
the field and across fields that intersect on routine questions. 
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6. COSTS OF COLLABORATION 
 
Finally, Rehg turns his attention to transforming clashes among cultures to the power of 
“multidisciplinary advisory committee” structures which themselves could found a 
heterogeneous argument culture. Such groups could engage in regulatory work that 
would set common standards across subspecialties of the sciences. The ideal of consensus 
and respect for science may produce incentives. However, such groups would be 
characterized by common cause more than common ground. New argument cultures raise 
questions of trust and legitimacy, over and against the social institutions that train, 
credential, and reward participation within social structures that reward specialization of 
practice and expert knowledge. Indeed, collaboration itself is a risky business in so far as 
pressures to find workable solutions may obscure the costs of error and the distribution of 
benefits. Greater power in triangulated interests does not necessarily result in better 
visions of a common good. Collaboration is one way of overcoming the antipathy that 
characterizes two cultures, but its risks and rewards need to be plumbed further. 
 
7. ARGUMENT CULTURES AND THE OTHER 
 
In the spirit of Rehg’s extension from “Two Cultures” to an understanding of argument 
cultures more generally, I offer an addition. In its most fundamental sense, an argument 
culture is a productive, architectonic, social and intellectual space for reasoned assertion 
and exchange. Yet, part of the culture’s project includes the imagination and positioning 
of spaces that do not reside within its own enlightened boundaries. More, such distancing 
is internalized by participants who remember how far the culture has come since its 
inception and think about how far it has yet to go. Thus, each argument culture is defined 
by its outlooks for self and for others. The other to the culture consist of (1) individuals or 
groups relevant to but not credential by the culture, and (2) generations whose work is 
held not be within the scope of present best practices. Snow’s contribution was to 
recognize the danger in leaving attitudes toward the other unaccounted; Rehg’s reading 
leads to reflection on repair work among cultural relationships by taking into account the 
benefits of hospitality, translation, and collaboration across cultures. I would add that 
communicative engagement with the other, not of the culture, constitutes a reflective 
space within each culture (whether fully reflected upon or simply taken for granted), 
including 
 
(i)   that which is reasonably beyond the boundaries of a participant culture 
(ii)  communication which enables and limits understanding of risk and 
uncertainty between cultures, 
(iii)  those situations which invite collaboration in the translation of overlapping 
work or prompt contestation for competing grants of legitimacy 
(iv)  dialectical tensions within the culture that call for strengthening boundaries 
or 
opening routes of exchange across topics and situations. 
 
Further, the other of an argument culture may be placed in the continuity and 
discontinuity among past, present, and future spaces within a culture when standards of 
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reason, evidence, debate, and claim change through controversy. Snow’s “Two Cultures” 
illustrates how post war science imagined literature and pre war literature imagined 
science, to the great loss of both. 
 
          Link to paper 
